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Abstract
This note shows that the competitive equilibrium is efficient in the Uzawa−Lucas
endogenous growth model with sector−specific externalities associated to human capital in
the goods sector for a large class of goods production technologies.
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  Most developed countries heavily subsidize education. This is typically justified on the basis 
of the perceived positive external effects of human capital accumulation which create a wedge 
between the social and private returns to education. Therefore, one may inquire whether the 
presence of such external effects does provide an incontrovertible rationale for the government 
intervention from a theoretical viewpoint. In a recent paper, Gómez (2004) shows that the 
competitive equilibrium is optimal in the Uzawa-Lucas model (Uzawa, 1965, Lucas, 1988) when 
there are sector-specific externalities associated with human capital in the goods sector, so 
government intervention is not justified. However, he makes the rather restrictive assumption 
that output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology. 
  Recent empirical studies conclude that the assumption of a unitary elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor in production is not supported by the data (e.g., Duffy and 
Papageorgiou, 2000, and Masanjala and Papageorgiou, 2004). This raises the question on 
whether the optimality result is satisfied for less restrictive goods production technologies as 
well. This note shows that Gómez’s (2004) result also holds under the assumption that the goods 
production technology is such that the private marginal productivity of human capital devoted to 
the production of goods is proportional to its social marginal productivity. Although at first sight 
this assumption might seem to be rather restrictive, it is satisfied by production functions that are 
commonly used in both theoretical and applied work; in particular, by CES technology. The 
intuition for this result is simple: The time allocation decision of the private agent is the same as 
that of the central planner, since the return to and the cost of investing in human capital change 
in the same proportion. 
  The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the decentralized 
economy. Section 3 describes the centrally planned economy, shows that the competitive 
equilibrium is optimal, and provides an intuitive explanation. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The decentralized economy 
2.1. Private agents 
  The economy is populated by a large number of identical infinitely lived representative 
agents who derive utility from the consumption of a private consumption good C. Each agent has 
a constant flow of one unit of time per period which can be allocated to work or learning. For 
simplicity, we assume that population is constant and normalized to one. The agent’s preferences 
are described by the intertemporal utility function 















C t , (1) 
where ρ is the subjective discount rate, and 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The 
agent maximizes (1) subject to the flow budget constraint 
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and the constraint on human capital accumulation 
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Here, K denotes physical capital, H, human capital, r, the interest rate, w, the wage rate, π, firms 
profits, u, work time, 1–u, learning time, and G is a positive, C
2, concave and strictly increasing 
function, so that   and  .  0 > ′ G 0 ≤ ′ ′ G
 Let  J be the current value Hamiltonian of the agent’s optimization problem: 
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  The first-order conditions for an interior solution are 
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 Output,  Y, is produced with a linearly homogeneous, C
2, concave production function 
  ) , , ( uH uH K F Y = , (5) 
where  uH  is the average human capital in the goods sector, and expresses sector-specific 
externalities associated with human capital employed by the sector producing goods. This 
function exhibits positive, but diminishing, marginal productivity in all factors, Fi > 0, Fii > 0, 
where Fi and Fii (i=1,2,3) are, respectively, the first and second derivatives of F with respect to 
its ith argument. 
  We shall also assume that technology is such that the private marginal productivity of 
human capital in the goods sector, F2(K,uH,uH), is proportional to its social marginal 
productivity, F2(K,uH,uH) + F3(K,uH,uH): 
  1 ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( 2 3 2 > = + α α uH uH K F uH uH K F uH uH K F . (6) 
Although this might seem to be a rather restrictive assumption, it is satisfied by production 
functions which are commonly used in both theoretical and applied work, as CES technology 
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technologies á la Jones and Manuelli (1990) as, for example, 
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and nested production functions as, for example, 
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  Profit maximization by competitive firms implies that capital and labor are used up to the 
point at which marginal product equates marginal cost: 
  ) , , ( 1 uH uH K F r = , (7a) 
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where r is the rate of return on physical capital and w is the wage rate. Since the production 
function exhibits decreasing returns-to-scale at the private level, the competitive firm earns 
positive profits 
  uH uH uH K F K uH uH K F uH uH K F ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( 2 1 − − = π . (7c) 
We assume that these profits are distributed back to households as dividends. 
  22.3. Equilibrium 
 Hereafter  let  v v v & = γ  denote the growth rate of the variable v. In what follows, the 
condition  uH uH =  will be imposed. In order to characterize the transitional dynamics, we 
transform the model by defining the new variables  ) (uH K z = , the ratio of physical capital to 
human capital in the goods sector, and  K C s = , the ratio of consumption to physical capital. 
Furthermore, let  H K x =  be the ratio of physical to human capital, and  λ θ = p , the relative 
price of human capital in units of goods. 
  In equilibrium, since F is linearly homogeneous it can be transformed as follows 
  ) ( ) 1 , 1 , ( z f uH z F uH Y = = , (8) 
where f is C
2, positive,  , and  0 > ′ f 0 < ′ ′ f . Hence, the marginal productivity of physical capital 
and the social marginal productivity of effective time, v, can be expressed as 
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  ) ( ) ( ) , , ( ) , , ( 3 2 z f z z f uH uH K F uH uH K F v ′ − = + = . (9b) 
The assumption (6) entails that 
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  From (2), using (7) and (8), we can obtain the overall resource constraint of the economy 
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  Using (3) and (11), the growth rate of  H K x =  is 
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  The growth rate of  λ θ = p  can be obtained from (4b)-(4d) as 
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  Log-differentiating (4a) with respect to time, and using (4c) and (9a), we derive the growth 
rate of consumption: 
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  Using (10), equation (4b) can be expressed as  ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( u G p z f z z f − ′ = ′ − α . Log-
differentiating this expression with respect to time, we have  u p z ηγ γ ξγ + = , where η and ξ are 
defined by  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( u G u u G − ′ − ′ ′ − = η  and  )) ( ) ( ( ) (
2 z f z z f z f z ′ − ′ ′ − = ξ . Note that  0 ≥ η  and 
0 > ξ . Since  u x z γ γ γ − = , the growth rates of z and u can be expressed as 
  ) ( ) ( η ξ ηγ γ γ + + = x p z , (15a) 
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  Using (11) and (14), the growth rate of  K C s =  is 
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  The system (15) characterizes the dynamics of the decentralized economy in terms of z, s, 
and u, recalling (12) and (13). Note that x and p must also be constant in the steady state. This 
will enable to simplify the computation of the steady state and the stability analysis. 
  The steady state can be computed as follows. Equating (12) to zero we obtain 
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Substituting s* from (16a) into (15c) and equating the result to zero, we have 
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  3which, after substitution in (13), entails that the steady state level of u is determined by the 
equation 
  0 * *) 1 ( *) 1 ( ) 1 ( = − − ′ + − − ρ σ u u G u G . (16c) 
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solution u*∈(0,1) if and only if the condition  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( G G G ′ + − < < − σ ρ σ  is met. We 
shall assume henceforth that equation (16b) has a positive solution z*>0. A sufficient condition 
for (16b) to have a positive solution z* for any u*∈(0,1) is that the production function F satisfy 
the Inada conditions, which entail that  ∞ = ′
→ ) ( lim
0 z f
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z . Equation (16a) can be 
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, and  0 *) 1 ( *) ( > − − ′ u G z f 0 * *)) ( * *) ( ( > ′ − z z f z z f , so that s*>0 if u*∈(0,1) and z*>0. For 
the transversality conditions (7e) and (7f) to be satisfied it must be that  0 * * < + + − K γ γ ρ λ  and 
0 * * < + + − H γ γ ρ θ , respectively. These conditions can be readily shown to be equivalent to 
, which is negative if 0<u*<1.  * *) 1 ( u u G − ′ −
  To analyze the stability of the steady state, we linearize the system (15) around the steady 













































































































where ξ* and η* stand for the variables ξ and η evaluated at the steady state. The last diagonal 
element,  , is a positive real eigenvalue of the matrix J. The other two 
eigenvalues of J are the eigenvalues of the 2×2 upper left submatrix of J, 


































  The determinant of J  is negative, 
0
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Taking into account the definition of ξ*, and using (16a) and (16b) to substitute for s* and 
, respectively, and  *) (z f ′ ) 1 ( *) *) 1 ( ( *) 1 ( σ ρ − − ′ − = − u u G u G  from (16c), the trace of  J  can 
be computed as  , which is positive. Hence,  0 * *) 1 ( tr > − ′ = u u G J  has one real positive 
eigenvalue and one real negative eigenvalue, and so, the coefficient matrix of the linearized 
system, J, has one negative real eigenvalue and two real positive eigenvalues, implying that the 
steady state is locally saddle-path stable. 
  43. The centrally planned economy 
  The central planner possesses complete information and chooses all quantities directly, 
taking all the relevant information into account. The planner maximizes (1) subject to (3) and 
  . (17)  C uH uH K F K − = ) , , ( &
Let J be the current value Hamiltonian of the planner’s maximization problem, and let λ and 
θ be the multipliers for the constraints (17) and (3), respectively: 
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The first-order conditions for an interior solution are similar to that of the market economy 
(4), but (4b) and (4d) should be substituted, respectively, with 
  H u G H uH uH K F uH uH K F ) 1 ( )) , , ( ) , , ( ( 3 2 − ′ = + θ λ , (4b’) 
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  Using (4b’), (4c) and (4d’), the growth rate of  λ θ = p  is again obtained as (13). Hence, 
proceeding in a similar manner to that in the case of the market economy, we find that the system 
(15) characterizes the dynamics of the centralized economy in terms of z, s, and u, recalling (12) 
and (13). Caballé and Santos (1993) show that there is a unique and saddle-path stable steady 
state if and only if  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( G G G ′ + − < < − σ ρ σ , under the assumption that the 
production function satisfies the Inada conditions. Although we have not required the fulfillment 
of the Inada conditions, we shall assume that the steady state of (15) is feasible, so the analysis of 
Caballé and Santos (1993) applies as well. 
  The system (15) describes both the dynamics of the market economy and the dynamics of 
the centrally planed economy. Hence, the decentralized economy replicates the first-best 
optimum attainable by a central planner, so we can state our main result. 
 PROPOSITION  1:  The competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal in the Uzawa-Lucas model 
with sector-specific externalities associated with human capital in the goods sector when the 
production function is such that the private marginal productivity of human capital devoted to 
the production of goods is proportional to its social marginal productivity. 
4. Discussion 
  The result in Proposition 1 can be intuitively explained as in Gómez (2004). Lucas (1990) 
showed that a constant flat-rate tax on labor income is neutral in the market economy since the 
introduction of a wage tax with a constant rate reduces in the same proportion the returns and the 
cost of investment in human capital. A similar argument can be used to explain the optimality of 
the competitive equilibrium in presence of sector-specific externalities. 
  Comparison of (4b) and (4b’) shows that, in equilibrium, the difference in perception 
between the individual agent in the market economy and the central planner is that the private 
return to effective work time, as seen by the individual agent, is the wage rate, 
  α )) ( ) ( ( ) , , ( 2 z f z z f uH uH K F w ′ − = = ,  
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The private return is lower than the social return as the representative agent does not take into 
account the effect of the sector-specific externality. In this model, human capital is produced 
using time and human capital as inputs and, therefore, the sole cost of investing in human capital 
  5is foregone earnings. Thus, although the agent does not realize that the private return to effective 
time (the wage rate) is lower than its social return, as the return to and the opportunity cost of 
human capital accumulation augment in the same proportion, the time allocation decision of the 
individual agent is the same as that of the central planner. 
  The former argument can be more formally stated by considering the time allocation margin 
of choice. As noted by Lucas (1990), the allocation of time between working in the output sector 
and learning new skills must be such that the value of a unit of time spent producing at each date 
is equal, on the margin, to the value of spending that unit of time accumulating new human 
capital that will enhance production in the future. In the market economy, this condition can be 
obtained as follows. 
 Denoting  λ θ = p , equations (4c) and (4d) entail that 
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Solving this differential equation yields 
  . (19)  ∫
∫ − − ∫ − − + =
T
t
d r u G d r u G d u w e e T p t p
t
T
t κ κ κ
κ τ τ τ τ τ τ ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
)) ( )) ( 1 ( ( )) ( )) ( 1 ( (
The fulfillment of the transversality condition (4e) entails that 
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Hence, taking the limit of p(t) as T goes to infinity in (19), taking into account that 
, where p* denotes the steady state value of p, we have  ∞ < =
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Eq. (3) entails that  . Thus, multiplying both sides of (20) with H(t), and 
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Equation (4b) can be expressed as  H u G p wH ) 1 ( − ′ = , which, using (21) yields 
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  In the centrally planned economy, the equivalent condition can be obtained in a similar 
manner. Equation (4b’) can be expressed as 
  ) 1 ( u G v − ′ =θ λ , (23a) 
where  v is the social return to effective time defined in (18). Using (18), Eq. (4d’) can be 
expressed as: 
  . (23b)  u v u G λ θ ρ θ − − − = )) 1 ( ( &
Similarly to the case of the market economy, from (4c), (23b), (6) and (23a), we can obtain 
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The social return to physical capital and its private return coincide, i.e., 
) ( ) , , ( 1 z f uH uH K F r ′ = = . By assumption (6), the social return to effective labor is proportional 
to its private return,  w v α = . Thus, comparison of (22) and (24) clearly shows that the time 
allocation decision of the representative agent is the same as that of the central planner, since the 
return to and the cost of investing in human capital have changed in the same proportion. 
  65. Conclusions 
  We have shown that the competitive equilibrium is efficient in the Uzawa-Lucas 
endogenous growth model when the average human capital employed in the production of goods 
has an external effect in this sector. Thus, this type of externalities does not provoke a market 
failure and does not provide a rationale for government intervention. This result holds up under 
the assumption that the production technology is such that the private marginal productivity of 
human capital devoted to the production of goods is proportional to its social marginal 
productivity. This condition is satisfied by production functions commonly used in both 
theoretical and applied work as, for instance, the CES technology. 
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